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Abstract
We report results from a randomized experiment designed and implemented by the Brazil-
ian central government audit agency to test whether increased audit risk deters corruption and
waste in local public procurement and improves provision of public services. We measure
waste and corruption as irregularities in local public procurement and service delivery un-
covered by central government auditors. Our estimates suggest that increasing audit risk by
about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of non-competitive procurement modalities
adopted by local managers by about 17 percent. Higher audit risk also reduced the proportion
of local procurement processes involving waste or corruption by about 20 percent. In contrast,
we ￿nd no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided pre-
ventive and primary health care services, measured using client satisfaction surveys. We also
￿nd no evidence that higher audit risk had an effect on local compliance with national guide-
lines of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Fam￿lia, measured in terms of appropriate
inclusion of bene￿ciaries into the program or their compliance with health and education con-
ditionalities.
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11 Introduction
Waste and corruption are two key determinants of the cost of public service provision. Keep-
ing waste and corruption￿rent extraction for short￿low is important in its own right and is
also widely believed to be a driver of economic development (Rose-Ackermann 1999, 2004).
However, measuring rent extraction objectively is notoriously challenging.1 It is even more
challenging to assess whether rent extraction is responsive to policy intervention because top-
down monitoring policies in particular are only rarely truly or "as if" randomly assigned.
In this paper we report results from a randomized evaluation designed to test whether higher
audit risk deters corruption and waste in local public procurement and improves provision of
public services in Brazil. Following the economic approach to crime (Becker 1968), an of￿cial
will shirk or steal if and only if the expected utility from doing so exceeds utility under the
person’s best alternative. Expected utility depends on the magnitude of sanctions if caught
and the probability of their application. While higher audit risk should lower the expected
utility from shirking or stealing and hence deter rent extraction, the magnitude of this effect
depends on the probability that sanctions are applied conditional on detection. In the Brazilian
setting analyzed here, as in many other countries, the probability that local of￿cials are punished
through ￿nes, loss of mandate or prison time is typically considered to be very low (Arantes
2004). To what extent higher audit risk deters waste and corruption in such environments is
therefore an open and important empirical question.
Our research design relies on the randomization of 120 municipalities into a treatment group,
exposed to a roughly 20 percentage points higher annual probability of being audited than the
5% audit probability in the control group, effectively consisting of the 5’400 remaining mu-
nicipalities in Brazil.2 The randomization was designed by the Brazilian federal government
internal audit agency (Controladoria-Geral da Uniªo, CGU) and carried out and publicly an-
1Di Tella and Schargrodski (2003) look at prices paid by hospitals for basic supplies before and after a crackdown on
corruption. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) examine the difference between funds disbursed by the central government
and funds reportedly recieved by schools. Golden and Picci (2005) compare physical public infrastructure to the
cumulative amount of government spending on that infrastructure. Olken (2007) computes "missing" expenditures in
road construction using independent cost estimates provided by engineers. Ferraz and Finan (2010) construct corruption
measures based on audit ￿ndings. Litschig and Zamboni (2010) also use audit results to measure rents, but without
distinguishing between waste and corruption.
2Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil (below the federal and state governments).
2nounced in May 2009.3 In order to ensure that municipalities were aware of their treatment
status, mayors in treatment group municipalities also received a letter from CGU, stating that
they were part of a group of 120 municipalities, 30 out of which would be audited one year
later.4 In May 2010, CGU sampled 30 treatment as well as 30 control municipalities as part of
the regular random auditing process. From May 2010 onwards, treatment group municipalities
were again exposed to a roughly 5% annual audit probability.5 The treatment thus consisted of
a temporary increase in audit risk of about 20 percentage points.
We measure waste and corruption as irregularities in local public procurement and service
delivery uncovered by CGU auditors. If compliance with homogeneous national regulations is
socially bene￿cial, irregularities in procurement or service delivery uncovered by auditors pro-
vide an objective measure of rent extraction by local executive of￿cials, either through outright
corruption or low effort on the job.6 For the vast majority of the regulations considered by audi-
tors in Brazil, compliance is likely to be socially bene￿cial although typically privately costly.7
For example, procurement regulations are designed to ensure that the public pays the lowest
price available for a given good or service required, yet implementing a competitive procure-
ment procedure, such as a (reverse) auction, is privately costly for the local manager. Similarly,
health ministry regulations require medical staff to provide certain service hours, which is again
privately costly, yet bene￿cial for service users.
We focus on irregularities overall, rather than one particular type of rent extraction such as
corruption. Our reasons for doing so are twofold. First, irregularities are based on objectively
veri￿able facts, while identi￿cation of proper corruption episodes inevitably requires judgment
since few cases are clear-cut in practice. CGU auditors themselves explicitly abstain from
making such judgments and leave it to prosecutors to decide whether to further investigate
certain irregularities and potentially press charges against particular individuals. Our second
3We introduced the idea of conducting a randomized evaluation to CGU staff and were involved in the early design
stage of the project.
4This implies that we cannot disentangle the effect of simply receiving a letter from CGU from the effect of exposure
to a higher audit probability. However, the effect of the letter "treatment" is likely to be orders of magnitude smaller
than the effect of exposure to an objectively higher audit risk.
5Treatment group municipalities were thus never exposed to lower audit risk than those in the control group.
6Effort can be seen as negative rents as in Barro (1973) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
7IntheterminologyofBandiera, PratandValletti(2009)wethinkofirregularitiesuncoveredbyauditorsasameasure
of active waste in government spending: compliance is socially bene￿cial yet privately costly.
3reasonforfocusingonoverallirregularitiesisthatthelawisnotlimitedtopenalizingcorruption,
which requires a relatively high standard of proof because individuals can go to jail if convicted,
but allows prosecutors to charge individuals with the lesser offense of "acts of administrative
misconduct". Since higher audit risk should operate on both corruption and administrative
misconduct, a comprehensive measure of rents is more appropriate for our purposes.8
In order to increase sample size, we supplement the 60 municipalities sampled for an audit
in May 2010 with 60 control group municipalities that were sampled two months earlier in
March 2010.9 Our procurement data span the entire range of locally provided public services in
Brazil, including preventive and primary health care, elementary education, housing and urban
infrastructure, and transportation. In addition, we use survey data collected by auditors to assess
the quality of preventive and primary health care services under a nation-wide program (Saœde
da Fam￿lia) and to assess local compliance with national guidelines of the conditional cash
transfer program (Bolsa Fam￿lia).10
Our main empirical results provide clear evidence in favor of the prediction that local of-
￿cials reduce rent extraction in response to higher audit risk. Our estimates suggest that in-
creasing audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of non-competitive
procurement modalities adopted by local managers by about 17 percent. Higher audit risk also
reduced the proportion of local procurement processes involving waste or corruption by about
20 percent. Whether these effects re￿ect a net reduction in rent extraction or merely a substi-
tution over time￿with treatment group municipalities "making up" at least some lost rents in
subsequent periods￿we cannot say. In either case, however, the results provide strong empiri-
cal support for the economic approach to crime (Becker 1968).
In contrast, we ￿nd no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of preventive
and primary health care services provided under the Saœde da Fam￿lia program, measured using
client satisfaction surveys. Since potential punishments for serious irregularities in procurement
8We could, of course, attempt to code corruption as an additional outcome measure if required.
9Our relatively small sample size also precludes meaningful subgroup analysis. We have investigated, for exam-
ple, whether higher audit risk has a different effect on rent extraction for ￿rst- or second-term mayors and found no
signi￿cant difference there. Results are available on requrest.
10There are other major programs, in education for example, as well as programs and projects that run only in a subset
of municipalities, for which we do not have the audits data.
4include jail, while for service delivery they only include ￿nes or loss of the job, differences in
potential punishments might drive the difference in results. A complementary interpretation is
that irregularities in service provision cannot be identi￿ed with the same precision as irregulari-
ties in procurement and so higher audit risk might matter less to service providers, compared to
procurement of￿cials. Irregularities in procurement are relatively easy to identify because local
of￿cials are required to document each step of the process. In contrast, the behavior of local ser-
vice providers is much harder to verify through a CGU audit. For example, while health facility
users might complain about infrequent opening hours of the health post, health staffers could
easily dispute this fact and auditors would have a hard time verifying any of these competing
claims.
We also ￿nd no evidence that higher audit risk had an effect on local compliance with na-
tional guidelines of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Fam￿lia, measured in terms of
appropriate inclusion of bene￿ciaries into the program or their compliance with health and edu-
cation conditionalities. Again, differences in punishment are likely to be part of the explanation
for the zero effect since the punishment for overstating the number of kids in the household or
for not sending them to school, for example, is at most the loss of the bene￿t. Another interpre-
tation, which is supported by our data, is that most Bolsa Fam￿lia recipients were appropriately
included in the program￿they were poor enough￿and they already complied with health and
education conditionalities to a large extent.11 Thus, they could not respond to higher audit risk
because they were doing nothing wrong in the ￿rst place.
To our knowledge the only antecedent to our study using a (￿eld) experimental research de-
sign is Olken (2007), who examines the effect of a higher audit probability on corruption in
road construction in Indonesia. He ￿nds that an increased probability of a government audit,
from a baseline of 4 percent to 100 percent, reduces "missing" expenditures by 8 percentage
points relative to total project expenditures. As in our case, Olken’s research design essentially
evaluates the effect of a temporary (and project-speci￿c) increase in audit risk. Compared to the
proportion of non-competitive procurement modalities and the proportion of local procurement
processes involving waste or corruption used in our study, Olken’s measure of corruption is
11Compliance with education and health conditionalities might of course be overstated by local of￿cials.
5clearly more precise. The advantages of our outcomes are that they measure rents more broadly,
encompassing both waste and corruption, and that they are available for government procure-
ment across the entire range of locally provided public services, not just for road construction.
Moreover, our survey data also allow us to go beyond input measures, such as "missing" expen-
ditures, and examine potential effects on outputs, such as quality of public services.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the audits program and give
institutional background on the enforcement of public sector regulations in Brazil. Section 3
presents theoretical predictions regarding the effect of higher audit risk on shirking or stealing
by local of￿cials. We discuss the experimental design and our estimation approach in Section
4. In Section 5 we present the data on irregularities in local public procurement and service
delivery. Estimation results are presented in Section 6. We conclude with a discussion of
limitations and extensions.
2 Audits program and institutional background
2.1 The random audits program
The random audits program was initiated under the government of Luiz InÆcio Lula da Silva in
March 2003 with the explicit objective of ￿ghting corruption and waste in local public spending.
Most municipalities were eligible for federal audit from the start of the program with the ex-
ception of state capitals.12 Several rounds of sampling occur each year through a public lottery.
The machinery used for the selection of municipalities is the same as that used for a popular
national (money) lottery and results are broadcast on television and through other media. As
of July 2010, 33 rounds have been carried out with 60 municipalities sampled in recent rounds.
Sampling is geographically strati￿ed by state and there is no doubt that the sampling is truly
random.
The program is implemented by the general comptroller’s of￿ce (CGU), the internal audit
institution of the federal government. When a municipality is selected, the CGU headquarters in
Brasilia determines the speci￿c aspects of programs and projects that are audited and issues de-
12More speci￿cally, eligibility for federal audit is based on a population threshold which was successively increased
from 20’000 to 500’000.
6tailed inspection orders (ordens de servi￿o)￿standardized sets of program- or project-speci￿c
inspections￿to state CGU branches. For simplicity we will usually refer to service orders as
inspections, although technically service orders are sets of inspections. Teams of auditors that
are based in these state branches are then sent to the sampled municipality. Transfers eligible
for audit include those that are earmarked to carry out national health and education policies
(legais), direct transfers to citizens (diretas), as well as other negotiated transfers (voluntarias),
but exclude revenue-sharing transfers, such as those from the Fundo de Participa￿ªo dos Mu-
nic￿pios. Inspections occur for a subset of eligible federal transfers made during the preceding
two to three years.13
The number of auditors dispatched depends on municipality size (area and population), the
proportion of rural and urban areas and the number of inspection orders, which in turn depends
on the number of programs and projects running in the municipality. For instance, a munici-
pality with a small population and a low number of items to be checked, but with a large rural
area may require more auditors than another municipality with larger population but more peo-
ple living in urban areas. In addition, municipalities for which the CGU has received a lot of
complaints or where the mayor was recently impeached, receive larger teams.
Within a week of the municipality sampling, auditors spend about two weeks in the munic-
ipality in order to carry out their inspection orders. The quality of public services is assessed
through interviews with the local population and service staff members. Auditors then write a
report which details all the irregularities encountered during their mission. Reports include the
amounts of resources audited, and if possible, any fraction that was diverted, wasted or stolen.
This fraction is just a preliminary estimate, however. The exact amount diverted can only be
assessed through a more detailed inspection which occurs only if it is subsequently deemed
appropriate by the prosecutor in charge of the municipality. Municipality mayors are given the
possibility to comment on the draft report within ￿ve business days. Auditors in turn explain
whether or not they accept the mayor’s justi￿cation of problems found.
13Exceptions to this rule are possible if warranted by the program under inspection.
72.2 The enforcement of public sector regulations
Final audit reports are sent to local legislatures, the federal ministries which are remitting the
transfers, external audit institutions at state and federal levels, as well as state and federal pros-
ecutors. Prosecutors then decide whether to further investigate the irregularities uncovered by
auditors and whether and what charges to press against particular individuals. If convicted of
corruption, defendants may be imprisoned for 1 to 8 years, in addition to losing their mandate
and incurring ￿nes. If convicted of "acts of administrative misconduct" or "improbity", punish-
mentsincludethelossofmandate, thesuspensionofpoliticalrightsfor8to10years, prohibition
from entering into public contracts for 10 years as well as the obligation to reimburse public
coffers.14
3 Theoretical predictions
Following the economic approach to crime, an of￿cial will shirk or steal if and only if the
expected utility from doing so exceeds utility under the person’s best alternative. Expected
utility depends on the magnitude of sanctions if caught and the probability of their application.
Using Becker’s (1968) notation, let Y denote the income or monetary equivalent of committing
an irregularity, f the ￿ne or monetary equivalent of the punishment, p the probability that the
punishment is applied and Ui.Y/ person i’s utility function, which is assumed increasing in Y.
The expected utility from shirking or stealing is then as follows:
E.Ui/ D pUi.Y ￿ f / C .1 ￿ p/Ui.Y/
In this simple framework, the person will shirk or steal if and only if E.Ui/ ￿ ￿i, where ￿i
denotes i’s best alternative. It is clear that if higher audit risk increases p￿thereby lowering




D Ui.Y ￿ f / ￿ Ui.Y/ < 0
14See Arantes (2004) on the organization and legal instruments at the disposal of the Brazilian "Ministerio Publico".
8Butthemagnitudeofthiseffectdependsontheprobabilitythatsanctionsareappliedconditional
on being audited. Let pc denote the probability of sanctions conditional on receiving an audit
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This equation makes it clear that the same variation in audit risk affects expected utility differ-
ently, depending on the probability that sanctions are applied conditional on being audited and
depending on the severity of sanctions. Speci￿cally, the predicted reduction of irregularities
due to higher audit risk is stronger, the more likely it is that sanctions are applied conditional
on detection and the more severe the punishment. Since in our case potential punishments for
serious irregularities in procurement include jail, while for service delivery they only include
￿nes or loss of the job, the economic approach to crime provides a simple interpretation of our
differential results for procurement and service delivery. A complementary interpretation is that
irregularities in service provision cannot be identi￿ed with the same precision as irregularities
in procurement￿pc is likely lower in service delivery￿and so higher audit risk should matter
less to service providers, compared to procurement of￿cials.
4 Experimental design
The randomization was designed by the Brazilian federal government internal audit agency
(Controladoria-Geral da Uniªo, CGU) and carried out on May 12th 2009. The machinery
used for the selection of treatment group municipalities was the same as that used for regular
CGU audits and the results were later broadcast on television and through other media. The
randomization of 120 municipalities into the treatment group was strati￿ed by state as shown
in Table 1. At the time of the randomization it was publicly announced that out of the 120
municipalities in the treatment group, 30 would be sampled for a regular CGU audit one year
later in May 2010.16 It was also announced that the 120 municipalities in the treatment group
were not eligible for regular CGU audits until May 2010, while the control group, consisting
15For simplicity we assume that the probability of detection of the irregularity conditional on being audited is 1.
16Portaria N.o 930, May 8th 2009.
9of the remaining 5’400 municipalities, could be sampled during regular lotteries as usual.17 In
order to ensure that municipalities were aware of their treatment status, mayors in treatment
group municipalities also received a letter from CGU containing the above information.
While the initially announced (ex ante) probability of an audit for treatment group munici-
palities was thus 25%, the corresponding annual audit risk for control municipalities depended
on the number of lotteries and the probability of being sampled in each of these. From May
2009 to May 2010 there were four regular lotteries, namely the 29th, 30th, 31st and 32nd, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Table 2 presents the audit probabilities that municipalities from different
states faced in the 29th lottery. For most states, audit probabilities per round of the lottery are
about 1 or 2 percent. These probabilities were essentially unchanged from previous rounds and
remained as such for subsequent lotteries.
In the 32nd regular lottery, the details of which were announced on April 30th 2010, 30
municipalities were drawn from the treatment group and 30 from the control group.18 Table 3
shows that, because sampling in both groups was strati￿ed by state, ex post audit probabilities
in the treatment group varied between 16.7% and 50%, with a modal probability of 25%. Since
the details of the actual sampling scheme used in May 2010 were unknown to the public until a
few days before the 32nd lottery, the relevant audit risk for treatment group municipalities that
could have affected the behavior of local of￿cials likely was 25%.
The corresponding annual audit risk for control municipalities can be approximated as fol-
lows:
P.AuditjControl/ D 1 ￿ P.No Audit in any of lotteries 29 through 32/
D 1 ￿ [1 ￿ P.Draw 29th/]3 ￿ [1 ￿ P.Draw 32nd/]
Table 3 shows that annual audit probabilities in the control group fell mostly in the range
of 3 to 6 percent. Ex ante, that is from May 12th 2009 to April 30th 2010, treatment group
municipalities were thus exposed to a roughly 20 percentage points higher annual probability
17As mentioned above, state capitals and municipalities with population size above 500’000 are exempt from the
random audits program. A few other municipalities had received special audits recently and were also exempt from the
experiment (Portaria N.o 930, May 8th 2009).
18Portaria N.o 862, April 30th 2010.
10of being audited than the treatment group municipalities.
4.1 Estimation approach
Given the experimental design, estimation is a straightforward comparison of sample mean
outcomes from treatment and comparison groups. Let Ym denote the outcome variable in mu-
nicipality m; ￿m the (heterogeneous) treatment effect, Dm the treatment indicator and Um other
unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The data generating process can then be described
as:
Ym D ￿ C ￿mDm C Um (1)
Randomization ensures that, in expectation, Dm is uncorrelated with Um, so b ￿
OLS provides
an unbiased and consistent estimator of the average treatment effect E.￿m/: Since treatment
probabilities vary somewhat by state due to the conditional randomization, we also present
speci￿cations with state ￿xed effects cs: We also provide a check on small sample bias by
including pre-treatment municipality characteristics and mayor’s characteristics, such as age,
gender and education, as well as the mayor’s party af￿liation Wm into the regression. Finally,
we present results separately for the sample from the 32nd lottery and for the pooled sample
including the 31st lottery, which we add to increase the precision of our estimates. It is worth
emphasizing that including municipalities from the 31st lottery might lead to bias if outcomes
were systematically different from one year to the next. Fortunately this turns out not to be the
case as evidenced by the fact that point estimates vary only slightly across the 32nd and pooled
estimation samples.
5 Data
Having described some key features of the Brazilian control system and the experimental de-
sign, we now present our micro-data on irregularities in local public procurement and public
service delivery in more detail. Our empirical analysis is based on a random sample of 60 + 60
municipalities that have been audited in March and May 2010, respectively. Audit ￿ndings for
each municipality were compiled into a database by CGU staff. Following the practice of the
11comptroller general’s of￿ce, we refer to the reported infractions of public sector management
regulations as irregularities in public administration. It is worth emphasizing that each reported
irregularity constitutes a breach of a speci￿c legal norm by a local of￿cial or service provider
and is potentially subject to prosecution by state procuracies.
5.1 Local public procurement data
Our procurement data are at the level of individual procurement processes and cover all pur-
chases made with federal funds during the audit period, from January 2009 to May 2010 for
the 32nd lottery and from January 2008 to December 2009 for the 31st lottery as illustrated in
Figure 1.19 The procurement data span the entire range of locally provided public services in
Brazil, including preventive and primary health care, elementary education, housing and urban
infrastructure, and transportation.
Table 4 presents the distribution of goods and services purchased by local governments in
our sample. The unit of observation is an individual procurement process. Staple foods, used
for a public school meal program, for example, are the most frequently acquired items. Other
commonly purchased items are medications for the basic health care program, as well as other
non-durable goods. Public works and contracted-out services also constitute a large fraction of
local public procurements. Table 4 also shows that there are no obvious differences between
treatment and control municipalities in terms of the types of goods and services bought, nor are
there difference between control municipalities from the 31st and 32nd lotteries.
Table 5 presents the distribution of procurement modalities by treatment status. The unit
of observation is again an individual procurement process. There are six modalities in total,
three of which restrict the number of competitors and are legal only below certain purchase
amounts, and another three modalities without restrictions on the number of competitors.20 We
refer to non-competitive procurement modalities as direct purchases by the local administration,
"bids only by invitation" (convite), a modality which leaves it at the total discretion of the local
19Because the date of each procurement process is not given in our data, only the year, we cannot exclude processes
that were completed prior to May 2009. The inclusion of these processes￿which could not have been affected by
higher audit risk by construction￿will bias our estimates towards zero.
20This distinction between procurement procedures that are open to all interested suppliers and those that are not is
made in the Agreement on Government Procurement in Article VII.3. Brazil is not formally a member of the treaty.
12administration whom to "invite",21 and the modality "only pre-registered bidders" (tomada de
pre￿os), which restricts competition to pre-registered suppliers.22 Competitive modalities are
the "sealed-bid (reverse) auction" (concorrŒncia), "on-site (reverse) auction" (pregªo presen-
cial) and "electronic (reverse) auction" (pregªo eletrınico).
A noteworthy feature of the data is that in the control group from the 32nd lottery, there
were 187 procurement processes of the non-competitive modality "bids only by invitation",
but there were only 97 processes using this modality in the treatment group. Similarly, of
the modality "only pre-registered bidders", there were 65 processes in this control group but
only 44 of them in the treatment group. For the remaining and more competitive modalities,
"sealed-bid (reverse) auction", "on-site (reverse) auction" and "electronic (reverse) auction", the
numbers of processes in treatment and control groups are essentially equal. It is also interesting
to note that there are no real differences in the proportions of procurement modalities between
control municipalities from the 31st and 32nd lotteries, suggesting that pooling across lotteries
is appropriate. For estimation purposes, we compute municipality-level proportions of non-
competitive modalities across treatment and control groups.
Table 6 presents the distribution of audit results for procurement by treatment status. Several
features of the data stand out. First, the share of irregular processes, that is, those that were
found to be non-compliant with procurement regulations in one way or another is about 0.72
and 0.71 in the control groups from the 32nd and 31st lotteries, respectively, but only about
0.54 in the treatment group. Common examples of irregular processes, given in Table 6, are
fractionalizing, that is, division of a purchase into smaller amounts in order to avoid more
competitive modalities or favoritism, that is, evidence that the contract was steered towards
certain suppliers.
Second, the share of processes that show evidence of fractionalizing is about 4% in the
treatment group but about 12% and 8.5% in the control groups from the 32nd and 31st lotteries,
respectively. This is consistent with the observation above that the number of non-competitive
21This corresponds to a limited tendering procedure under the Agreement on Government Procurement, Article
VII:3(c).
22This corresponds to a selective tendering procedure under the Agreement on Government Procurement, Article
VII:3(b).
13procurement processes is higher in the control group.
Third, a comparison of audit ￿ndings across control municipalities from the 31st and 32nd
lotteries reveals that the proportions are very similar for the majority of procurement processes,
except for the incidence of favoritism, simulated processes and other irregularities. It appears
in particular that in the 32nd lottery, irregularities coded previously as instances of favoritism
were now coded either as simulated processes or other irregularities. Since we are primarily
interested in measuring compliance with procurement regulations, rather than distinguishing
among cases of non-compliance, these differences are without consequence for our study. The
important fact is that the share of irregular procurement processes in the two control groups is
almost identical, 72% for the 32nd and 71% for the 31st lottery, respectively, while the irregular
share in the treatment group is 54%. For estimation purposes we aggregate the micro-data on
audit ￿ndings in procurement to the municipality level and compare the proportion of irregular
processes across treatment and control groups.
5.2 Survey data
As part of their standard service orders, CGU auditors conduct interviews and ￿eld visits that
are designed to assess public service quality at both the household and service-unit level. For
the preventive and basic health care program (Saœde da Fam￿lia), auditors ￿rst check the com-
pliance of service units with ministry of health guidelines, for example regarding adequacy of
the number of service personnel for their assigned service area and adequacy of the team com-
position (e.g. one doctor, one nurse, 12 technical assistants). Auditors then sample households
at random from locally provided sampling frames of service users. In our data, the auditors
interviewed 22 families on average per municipality in order to assess whether respondents re-
ceive adequate quality of care. For example, auditors ask whether the family receives regular
visits from community health workers and whether care is provided at the health post if needed.
For the conditional cash transfer program (Bolsa Fam￿lia), CGU headquarters provides au-
ditors in the ￿eld with a list of typically 30 randomly sampled transfer recipient households
based on a national sampling frame.23 Auditors conduct ￿eld visits to check whether trans-
23The exact number of respondents can vary depending on conditions in the ￿eld.
14fer recipient families are of a size and income level compatible with program guidelines and
whether children’s vaccinations are done regularly as required under the program. Auditors
also check school records to assess compliance with enrollment and attendance conditionalities
for obtaining the cash transfer.
Most of the survey responses are either yes, no, or not applicable, if the household required
no health services over the preceding year, for example. In the empirical analysis below we
aggregate the household-level data to the municipality level by computing the share that re-
sponded yes to a particular question out of the total of respondents who responded either yes or
no.
5.3 Caveats
There are three caveats worth pointing out regarding our measures of rent extraction.24 First, we
assumethatexistingregulationsonprocurementandservicedelivery￿whichde￿neirregularities￿
make sense, that is, they serve a legitimate purpose in a reasonable way.25 Put differently, we
take irregularities to be generally detrimental to public service delivery, rather than re￿ecting
attempts by well-meaning of￿cials to circumvent inef￿cient red tape. As mentioned above,
mayors, managers and service providers have the possibility to comment on the audit report.
Sometimes auditors concede that there are valid arguments for non-compliance and we exclude
these instances from our measures. Based on our reading of the regulations considered here,
we believe that reported irregularities are for the most part undesirable from a social point of
view because they either involve a direct waste or loss of public resources or complicate the
detection of such mismanagement. It is also worth noting that the regulations pertaining to
public procurement re￿ect international best practices as laid out in the WTO’s Agreement on
Government Procurement.
The second caveat is that we need to assume that auditors themselves were not bribed into
manipulating audit ￿ndings (Mookherjee and Png, 1995). If this manipulation were for some
reason correlated with treatment status, it would bias our estimates. However, we believe that
24Only the ￿rst caveat is genuine to our study. The other two apply to measures of waste and corruption more
generally.
25Without this assumption we are still evaluating compliance with existing regulations.
15the institutional setup makes it very unlikely that auditors are corrupt. First, auditors are paid by
the federal government, not by local governments, which makes it less likely that they are cap-
tured by local special interests. Second, auditors work in teams of about 10 people. This makes
it hard to sustain collusion on any signi￿cant scale because the whole team has to be bribed in
order to conceal irregularities. Third, the interaction between auditors and local of￿cials is at a
single point in time (unknown ex ante), which again makes it harder to sustain collusion.
The third caveat is that even if auditors were incorruptible, the local elite might somehow
manage to manipulate what gets uncovered and what remains unnoticed. While this scenario is
plausible in general, it is unlikely in our case because local elites play no direct role in carrying
out the audit. Auditors go into a municipality with speci￿c orders to investigate particular
programs and projects and the items on their list are not subject to local review. Neither is it
likely that local managers succeed in systematically concealing irregular transactions such that
auditors fail to uncover them since the audit is very thorough, involving both ￿nancial auditing
and detailed inspection of public works and services.
5.4 Municipality and mayor characteristics
Data on municipality characteristics are obtained from several sources. Of￿cial local popula-
tion data for the year 2007 are from the population count conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro
de Geogra￿a e Estat￿stica (IBGE). Data on local income distribution and schooling are from
the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) based on the 2000 census. Mayor char-
acteristics and party af￿liations are from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Table 7 gives
difference in means tests for a host of pre-treatment covariates. With the exception of one party
af￿liation dummy, none of these differences are statistically signi￿cant and the magnitudes are
generally small. Table 7 also provides a joint test of the null hypotheses that the population
means of these covariates are equal across treatment and control groups. The F-statistic sug-
gests that the randomization worked, that is, it fails to reject the null at conventional levels of
signi￿cance (p-value=0.44).
166 Estimation results
Table 8 presents OLS estimates from equation 1 for the proportion of non-competitive pro-
curement modalities at the municipality level. Columns 1 through 5 are based solely on the
32nd lottery and provide the raw difference in means and estimates with state intercepts, mayor
party af￿liation dummies, municipality characteristics, and mayor’s characteristics, respec-
tively. Columns6through10showestimatesfromthesame￿vespeci￿cationsbutforthepooled
sample, including control municipalities from the 31st lottery. Treatment effect estimates ￿uc-
tuate around the -0.12 mark across speci￿cations and across the 32nd and pooled estimation
samples. This suggests both that the randomization worked and that outcomes do not systemat-
ically vary from one year to the next. Due to the doubling of the sample size, estimates become
statistically signi￿cant at 5% in the pooled sample, even before adding any controls. Given
that the control group mean proportion of non-competitive procurement processes is 0.70, the
effect corresponds to a 17% reduction approximately.26 Figure 2 shows that the difference in
sample means is not driven by outliers but that the treatment rotated the entire distribution of
non-competitive procurement processes to the left.
Table 9 presents impact estimates on the number of local procurement processes. Treat-
ment effect estimates ￿uctuate around -3 to -4 processes and are statistically signi￿cant at 10%
throughout and at 5% in the pooled sample, again even before adding control variables. Given
that the control group mean number of processes is about 14, the effect corresponds to a 20% to
30% reduction approximately. As with the proportion of non-competitive procurement modali-
ties above, Figure 3 shows that the treatment rotated the entire distribution of the number of pro-
curement processes to the left. The reduction in the number of procurements is entirely driven
by fewer non-competitive modalities (results omitted to save space). This result is consistent
with the previous ￿nding on procurement modalities since a typical way of circumventing more
competitive procedures, such as a sealed-bid (reverse) auction, is to fractionalize the purchase
(break it up into pieces) and conduct a series of less competitive procurement processes, such
26When we add state intercepts, mayor’s party af￿liation dummies, municipality characteristics, mayor’s characteris-
tics or a combination of these sets of covariates jointly, estimates of the treatment effect remain in the range shown in
the table. Standard errors remain largely unchanged because higher explained variance and fewer degrees of freedom
tend to cancel each other out. These additional robustness checks are available on request.
17as "bids only by invitation".
Another potential explanation for the reduction in non-competitive procurement processes is
that local managers were actually doing less procurement, not just different modalities, perhaps
in order to "sit out" the high audit risk year. From an empirical perspective, however, there is no
evidence that treatment group municipalities were spending less transfers from the central gov-
ernment during 2009 (results available on request). This zero effect on spending makes sense
from a practical point of view as well since for many goods, such as staple foods, medications or
contracted-out cleaning services, local governments hold few or no inventories at all and so they
need to make purchases to keep the administration running. Moreover, federal funds typically
must be used during the ￿scal year or else returned to the federal government, they cannot be
saved for later periods. So, not doing a procurement at all for an entire year is not an attractive
option for local of￿cials.
Table10presentsestimatesoftheimpactontheproportionofirregularprocurementprocesses.
A process is deemed irregular if the audit result from Table 6 is anything other than regular.
Treatment effect estimates ￿uctuate around the -0.14 mark, are statistically signi￿cant at 10%
in the sample from the 32nd lottery, and become statistically signi￿cant at 5% in the pooled
sample, again even without controls. Given that the control group mean proportion of irregu-
lar processes is again 0.70, the effect corresponds to a 20% reduction approximately. Figure 4
showsthatthetreatmentshiftedtheentiredistributionoftheproportionofirregularprocurement
processes to the left.
The top part of Table 11 presents impact estimates for a range of outcomes related to the
preventive and basic health care program (Saœde da Fam￿lia). In contrast to the effects found
for procurement, Table 11 shows no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of
health care services provided by local governments. For example, the average share of respon-
dents who say they receive regular visits from community health staff￿as required under the
preventive health program￿is essentially 93% in both treatment and control groups. The pro-
portion of respondents who say they receive health care at home when needed is about 70% in
the control group and about 80% in the treatment group, but the difference is not statistically
18signi￿cant.
Overall, out of the eleven outcomes considered here, none are statistically different between
treatment and control groups. Moreover, the size of the differences is typically small and often
the sign of the difference is the opposite of what theory would suggest. Since potential pun-
ishments for serious irregularities in procurement include jail, while for service delivery they
only include ￿nes or loss of the job, differences in potential punishments might drive the differ-
ence in results. A complementary interpretation is that irregularities in service provision cannot
be identi￿ed with the same precision as irregularities in procurement and so higher audit risk
might matter less to service providers, compared to procurement of￿cials. For example, while
health facility users might complain about infrequent opening hours of the health post, health
staffers could easily dispute this fact and auditors would have a hard time verifying any of these
competing claims.27
The bottom of Table 11 shows that higher audit risk did not seem to affect local compliance
with national guidelines of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Fam￿lia either. The ￿rst
two outcomes show that targeting of bene￿ciaries was unaffected since the proportion of appro-
priately included bene￿ciaries is negligibly (and statistically insigni￿cantly) different between
treatment and control respondents. The last three outcomes show the same qualitative result
for compliance with health and education conditionalities. Again, differences in punishment
are likely to be part of the explanation for the zero effect since the punishment for overstating
the number of kids in the household or for not sending them to school, for example, is at most
the loss of the bene￿t. Another interpretation, which is supported by the high compliance rate
evident in Table 11, is that most Bolsa Fam￿lia recipients were appropriately included in the
program￿they were poor enough￿and they already complied with health and education con-
ditionalities to a large extent. Thus, they could not respond to higher audit risk because they
were doing nothing wrong in the ￿rst place.
27Another interpretation is that there simply was not that much shirking on the job going on in preventive and basic
health care delivery. We consider this possibility less likely since substantial numbers of health service users in our data
do in fact indicate that health posts are not always open exactly as required by ministry of health regulations.
197 Conclusion
This paper provides experimental evidence that increasing audit risk by about 20 percentage
pointsreducedtheproportionofnon-competitiveprocurementmodalitiesadoptedbylocalman-
agers by about 17 percent. Higher audit risk also reduced the proportion of local procurement
processes involving waste or corruption by about 20 percent. As in Olken (2007), we cannot
say whether these effects re￿ect a net reduction in rent extraction or merely a substitution over
time￿with treatment group municipalities "making up" at least some lost rents in subsequent
periods. In either case, our estimates provide clear evidence in favor of the prediction that local
of￿cials reduce rent extraction in response to higher audit risk (Becker 1968).
In contrast, we ￿nd no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of preventive
and primary health care services, measured using client satisfaction surveys conducted by audi-
tors. Since potential punishments for serious irregularities in procurement include jail, while for
service delivery they only include ￿nes or loss of the job, differences in potential punishments
might drive the difference in results. A complementary interpretation is that irregularities in ser-
vice provision cannot be identi￿ed with the same precision as irregularities in procurement and
so higher audit risk might matter less to service providers, compared to procurement of￿cials.
We also ￿nd no evidence that higher audit risk had an effect on local compliance with na-
tional guidelines of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Fam￿lia, measured in terms of
appropriate inclusion of bene￿ciaries into the program or their compliance with health and edu-
cation conditionalities. Again, differences in punishment are likely to be part of the explanation
for the zero effect since the punishment for overstating the number of kids in the household or
for not sending them to school, for example, is at most the loss of the bene￿t. Another interpre-
tation, which is supported by our data, is that most Bolsa Fam￿lia recipients were appropriately
included in the program￿they were poor enough￿and they already complied with health and
education conditionalities to a large extent.
Audit intensity should be scaled up permanently if and only if the net bene￿ts of such a pol-
icy are positive. Although the results from increasing audit risk temporarily are encouraging, it
would take a permanent variation in audit risk to assess whether scaling up is indeed advisable,
20since local of￿cials might ￿nd ways to adapt to increased audit risk over time. Another compli-
cation is that assessing the bene￿ts of higher audit risk in monetary terms requires an estimate
of the value of a marginal increase in compliance with existing procurement regulations. A nec-
essary ￿rst step in this direction would be to quantify the cost savings from lower procurement
costs. Unfortunately, however, audit ￿ndings currently do not systematically report the price
at which local goods and services were purchased. More detailed data is therefore required to
better quantify the bene￿ts of higher audit intensity in terms of cost savings.
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23Table 1: Randomization lottery May 12th 2009
N Draws    P(Treatment) %
Acre (AC) 21 4.0
Amapá (AP) 15 2 4.0
Roraima (RR) 14 4.0
Alagoas (AL) 101 2 2.0
Amazonas (AM) 61 2 3.3
Bahia (BA) 415 10 2.4
Ceará (CE) 183 6 3.3
Espírito Santo (ES) 77 2 2.6
Goiás (GO) 245 6 2.4
Maranhão (MA) 216 6 2.8
Minas Gerais (MG) 849 14 1.6
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 77 2 2.6
Mato Grosso (MT) 140 2 1.4
Pará (PA) 142 4 2.8
Paraíba (PB) 222 6 2.7
Pernambuco (PE) 182 4 2.2
Piauí (PI) 223 6 2.7
Paraná (PR) 397 8 2.0
Rio de Janeiro (RJ) 88 2 2.3
Rio Grande do Norte (RN) 166 4 2.4
Rondônia (RO) 51 2 3.9
Rio Grande do Sul (RS) 495 10 2.0
Santa Catarina (SC) 292 6 2.1
Sergipe (SE) 74 2 2.7
São Paulo (SP) 636 10 1.6
Tocantins (TO) 138 2 1.4
Total  5'520  120
Source: Portaria N.º 930, May 8th 2009.
24Table 2: 29th lottery August 17th 2009
N                 Draws        P(Draw) %
Acre (AC)   18 2.3
Amapá (AP) 12 1 2.3
Roraima (RR) 13 2.3
Alagoas (AL) 82 2 2.4
Amazonas (AM) 53 1 1.9
Bahia (BA) 389 5 1.3
Ceará (CE) 166 3 1.8
Espírito Santo (ES) 71 1 1.4
Goiás (GO) 230 2 0.9
Maranhão (MA) 189 3 1.6
Minas Gerais (MG) 812 7 0.9
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 71 1 1.4
Mato Grosso (MT) 132 1 0.8
Pará (PA) 127 3 2.4
Paraíba (PB) 207 3 1.4
Pernambuco (PE) 159 3 1.9
Piauí (PI) 205 3 1.5
Paraná (PR) 378 3 0.8
Rio de Janeiro (RJ) 83 1 1.2
Rio Grande do Norte (RN) 153 3 2.0
Rondônia (RO) 46 1 2.2
Rio Grande do Sul (RS) 472 4 0.8
Santa Catarina (SC) 280 2 0.7
Sergipe (SE) 66 1 1.5
São Paulo (SP) 609 5 0.8
Tocantins (TO)  132                    1 0.8
Total                                              5'155   60
Source: Portaria N.º1581, August 11th 2009.
25Table 3: 32nd lottery May 10th 2010
Treatment Group Control Group Ex post Ex ante
N Draws P(Audit) N Draws P(Draw) P(Audit) dP dP
Acre 0 50.0 21 1.1 7.8 42.2 17.2




1.1 5.2 44.8 19.8





0.6 5.1 19.9 19.9





1.0 7.3 17.7 17.7





4.3 10.9 39.1 14.1
Espírito Santo 2 25.0 72 0.7 4.8 20.2 20.2




0.7 4.2 20.8 20.8
Bahia 10 2 20.0 385 2 0.5 4.3 15.7 20.7
Ceará 6 1 16.7 162 1 0.6 5.9 10.8 19.1
Goiás 6 1 16.7 230 1 0.4 3.0 13.7 22.0
Maranhão 6 1 16.7 200 1 0.5 5.2 11.5 19.8
Minas Gerais 14 4 28.6 813 4 0.5 3.0 25.5 22.0
Mato Grosso 2 1 50.0 131 1 0.8 4.9 45.1 20.1
Pará 4 1 25.0 125 1 0.8 7.7 17.3 17.3
Paraíba 6 1 16.7 206 1 0.5 4.7 11.9 20.3
Pernambuco 4 1 25.0 168 1 0.6 6.1 18.9 18.9
Piauí 6 1 16.7 200 1 0.5 4.8 11.9 20.2
Paraná 8 2 25.0 379 2 0.5 2.9 22.1 22.1
Rio Grande do Norte 4 1 25.0 153 1 0.7 0.7 24.3 24.3
Rio Grande do Sul 10 2 20.0 472 2 0.4 2.9 17.1 22.1
Santa Catarina 6 2 33.3 280 2 0.7 2.8 30.5 22.2
São Paulo 10 3 30.0 610 3 0.5 2.9 27.1 22.1
Tocantins 2 1 50.0 133 1 0.8 3.0 47.0 22.0
Total                          120 30          5'175    30
Source: Portaria N.º 862, April 30th 2010.  P(Draw), P(Audit) and dP are given as percentages.
For  the  treatment  group,  the  probability  of  being  drawn  in  the  32nd  lottery  equals  the
probability of receiving a CGU audit between May 2009 and May 2010, P(Draw)=P(Audit).
Ex ante (From May 8th 2009 to the publication of Portaria N.º 862 on Ap ril 30th 2010) this
probability was 30/120= 25%. Ex post, it is given above in column 3. For the control group,
the probability of receiving a CGU audit between May 2009 and May 2010 depends on the
probabilities of being drawn in the 29th, 30th, 31st and 32nd lotteries.  P(Audit) for the control
group is therefore calculated according to the following approximation: P(Audit)=1-[1-P(Draw
29th)]^3×[1-P(Draw 32th)].  dP gives the ex ante and ex post difference in audit probabilities



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 7: Difference in means tests for pre-treatment covariates
Treatment group Control group Difference P-value
Population 21'512 18'653 2'858 0.69
(6'822) (2'580) (7'294)
Income per capita 162.5 157 5.5 0.76
(15.6) (8.5) (17.8)
Average years of schooling 3.86 3.89 -0.03 0.88
(0.25) (0.12) (0.27)
Urbanization 0.57 0.59 -0.02 0.62
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Poverty headcount ratio 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.97
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Poverty gap 0.52 0.49 0.03 0.18
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Gini coefficient 0.56 0.56 0.00 0.76
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Radio station 0.46 0.45 0.01 0.62
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
PMDB 0.20 0.25 -0.05 0.52
(0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
PSDB 0.13 0.17 -0.04 0.56
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
PTB 0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
PT 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.86
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
PSB 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.72
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
PR 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.72
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
PP 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.07
(0.07) (0.02) (0.07)
PDT 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.37
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
F-statistic for the joint hypotheses that all differences are zero 1.02
(p-value) (0.44)
N 30 90
Notes: The first three columns give sample means, the difference in means and (standard
errors). Municipality characteristics are from the 2000 census, except population, which is










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 11: Effects on health and conditional cash transfer programs
Control mean Difference Control mean Difference
Proportion of adequately staffed teams 0.821*** -0.097 0.867*** -0.143
of community health workers (0.075) (0.114) (0.038) (0.092)
Proportion of respondents that receive 0.939*** -0.012 0.935*** -0.008
visits from community health workers (0.015) (0.027) (0.011) (0.024)
Proportion of respondents that receive 0.929*** -0.011 0.908*** 0.010
regular visits from community health staff (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036)
Proportion of adequately staffed teams 0.828*** 0.000 0.810*** 0.018
of the family health program (0.072) (0.102) (0.044) (0.084)
Proportion of regularly composed teams 0.758*** 0.138 0.845*** 0.051
of the family health program (0.082) (0.101) (0.04) (0.07)
Proportion of respondents that received 0.703*** 0.095 0.725*** 0.074
health services at home when needed (0.091) (0.112) (0.047) (0.079)
Proportion of respondents that were 0.749*** 0.049 0.784*** 0.015
attended by a doctor when needed (0.08) (0.104) (0.039) (0.076)
Proportion of respondents that were 0.937*** 0.020 0.949*** 0.007
attended by a nurse when needed (0.035) (0.041) (0.015) (0.025)
Proportion of respondents that were 0.790*** 0.009 0.786*** 0.013
attended by a dentist when needed (0.071) (0.111) (0.037) (0.092)
Proportion of respondents indicating that 0.458*** -0.059 0.371*** 0.028
the health post is open exactly as required (0.114) (0.154) (0.06) (0.118)
Proportion of respondents indicating that 0.004 0.005 0.011 -0.003
they were asked to pay a fee for service (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01)
F-statistic 0.46 0.57
(p-value) (0.92) (0.85)
Proportion of Bolsa Familia recipient families 0.956*** -0.031 0.953*** -0.028
with program compatible household size (0.014) (0.026) (0.01) (0.023)
Proportion of Bolsa Familia recipient families 0.857*** -0.009 0.856*** -0.007
with program compatible income (0.024) (0.038) (0.014) (0.033)
Proportion of Bolsa Familia recipient families 0.986*** 0.005 0.988*** 0.004
compliant with required regular vaccinations (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009)
Proportion of Bolsa Familia recipient 0.219*** -0.032 0.175*** 0.011
adolescents not enrolled at school (0.034) (0.05) (0.0189 (0.04)
Proportion of BF recipient and enrolled 0.058*** -0.01 0.090*** -0.042***
adolescents attending school infrequently (0.021) (0.023) (0.012) (0.016)
F-statistic 0.47 1.91
(p-value) (0.79) (0.10)
32nd lottery 31st and 32nd lottery
Notes: Unit of observation is the municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N varies by
outcome. F-statistic for the joint hypotheses that all differences in outcomes are zero.
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